On January 3, Wuhan Central Hospital called an\nemergency meeting of hospital department heads, emphasizing that they must\n\u201cspeak politics, speak discipline and speak science\u201d (\u8bb2\u653f\u6cbb, \u8bb2\u7eaa\u5f8b, \u8bb2\u79d1\u5b66), that they must not manufacture rumors or spread\nrumors, and that departments must closely monitor their own staff to ensure\nthat strict discipline is maintained. Medical personnel were explicitly\ninstructed not to disclose confidential information in public, and not to\ndiscuss the disease through the use of text, images or other means that might\nleave evidence. <\/p>\n\n\n
Since January, a\ndigital copy of notes from that January 3 meeting, made by the now-deceased\nJiang Xueqing, has appeared online, its authenticity verified by Chinese media.\nJiang\u2019s note include entries like: \u201c10 discipline regulations\u201d; \u201cdiscipline in\nmaintaining secrecy\u201d; \u201cno talking or discussion [without authorization.\u201d And\nthere is another phrase in Jiang\u2019s notes \u2013 \u201cspeak politics.\u201d <\/p>\n\n\n
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<\/div>The unfortunate deaths of Li Wenliang, Jiang\nXueqing and others owe in large part to \u201cspeaking politics.\u201d In the early\nstages of the coronavirus outbreak, \u201cspeaking politics\u201d meant the muzzling of\nmedical professionals in Wuhan, and it meant that doctors and nurses were\ndeprived of critical protections at a time of great urgency.<\/p>\n\n\n
Behind the rapid rise of the novel coronavirus\noutbreak that would overwhelm Wuhan Central Hospital and other hospitals in the\ncity is a decades-long lineage of \u201cspeaking politics\u201d that goes to the heart of\nthe political culture of the Chinese Communist Party. What, then, does it mean\nto \u201cspeak politics\u201d? <\/p>\n\n\n
\u201cSpeaking\u201d\n+ \u201cPolitics\u201d<\/strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n The\nsimple verb \u201cto speak\u201d in this context has layered meanings. Aside from the\nbasic sense of \u201ctalking\u201d and \u201csaying\u201d it bears the sense of \u201cpaying attention\u201d\nand \u201ctaking into account.\u201d Perhaps a better translation might be\n\u201cprioritizing.\u201d <\/p>\n\n\n In the\nAnalects, the teachings and thoughts of Confucius, there is the phrase\n\u201cspeaking credibility in relationships,\u201d or ji\u01ceng x\u00ecn xi\u016b m\u00f9<\/em> (\u8bb2\u4fe1\u4fee\u7766), which essentially means paying attention\nto or prioritizing trust, and seeking harmony. In this\ncontext, \u201cspeaking\u201d is both similar and different in meaning to the word \u201cgrab\u201d\nor \u201cgrasp\u201d (\u6293) as it appears in CCP discourse, which CMP has deal with previously<\/a>. Both of these words are used frequently in documents from the CCP\u2019s\nCentral Committee, and hang ever on the lips of Party and government officials.\nBut \u201cspeaking\u201d in fact implies an active choice made on the psychological level\n(\u7cbe\u795e\u5c42\u9762\u4e3b\u52a8\u9009\u62e9). <\/p>\n\n\n \u201cPolitics,\u201d though a simple enough word, is far more\ncomplicated when we talk about \u201cspeaking politics.\u201d The layers entail such\nmeanings as \u201cdistinguishing between the enemy and ourselves\u201d (\u5206\u6e05\u654c\u6211), or \u201crooting out the alien [or dissident]\u201d\n(\u94f2\u9664\u5f02\u5df1). There is also a\nsense of \u201cmaking use of style\u201d (\u53d1\u626c\u98ce\u683c) \u2013 another complicated phrase in an of itself \u2013\nand sometimes of \u201cstressing the equitable\u201d (\u8bb2\u6c42\u516c\u6b63) or \u201c[abiding by] the rules of the game\u201d (\u6e38\u620f\u89c4\u5219). <\/p>\n\n\n \u201cPolitics\u201d can have meanings that are abstract and\ndistant, or close and concrete, and these meanings of course shift with the\ntimes. <\/p>\n\n\n Earlier on within the discourse of the Chinese\nCommunist Party, \u201cspeaking politics\u201d had the sense in most cases of propaganda\nor oratory \u2013 speaking (or teaching) political lessons, or propagating political\nand economic ideas. At the same time, it bore the sense of emphasizing or\nprioritizing politics, which of course mean the Party\u2019s politics. <\/p>\n\n\n In 1942, Mao Zedong said in his Yan\u2019an Talks on\nArts and Literature<\/em>: \u201cThere are two standards for criticism in arts and\nliterature; one is the political standard, and the other is the artistic\nstandard.\u201d These speeches by Mao would become the fountainhead of the notion\nwithin the Chinese Communist Party that the arts and literature must \u201cspeak\npolitics.\u201d <\/p>\n\n\n In the first decade following its launch in 1946,\nthree years before the establishment of the PRC, uses of \u201cspeaking politics\u201d in\nthe People\u2019s Daily<\/em> were largely didactic, having to do with political\ninstruction. And there was a related sense of \u201cspeaking of principles\u201d (\u8bb2\u9053\u7406), which essentially meant just behaving properly.\nOn the front page of the May 14, 1948 edition of the People\u2019s Daily<\/em>, for\nexample, there was an article with the headline: \u201cExamining\nLeft-Leaning Mistakes Within the Party: Striking Others is Wrong<\/a>.\u201d A special working team had\nheld a meeting, said the report, to discuss whether it was permissible to hit\nothers. One old man was quoted as saying: \u201cI used to gamble all the time, and I\nsuffered much punishment under the old government. . . . But the Eight Route\nArmy [of the Chinese Communist Party] has come, and I don\u2019t hit others, and I\ndon\u2019t cuss, and I speak politics. Who in our village will gamble now?\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n By the 1950s, \u201cspeaking politics\u201d had already come\nin the arena of economics and the military to stand in opposition to the notion\nof specializing in doing business or in certain technologies or abilities\nwithout the proper nucleus of political consciousness. This stemmed from Mao\nZedong\u2019s notion, found in texts such as his essay \u201cConcerning Agricultural Questions,\u201d<\/a> that one should develop expertise only on the basis of a core of\ncorrect communist ideas. In the following passage, \u201cwhite\u201d signifies capitalist\nideas and impulses, set against the red of communism: <\/p>\n\n\n Our cadres in all walks of life must strive to be proficient in\ntechnology and business, so that they can become well-versed in their areas,\nboth red and professional. But the idea of first professionalizing and then\nbecoming red [turning to communist politics] is like first being white and then\nturning red, and this idea is wrong. Because this kind of person in fact wishes\nto continue being white, and to say they will later turn red is just a ruse.\nRight now, there are certain cadres who are red but not truly red, their ideas\nthose of the wealthy farmer class.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n Other slogans that expressed this idea in the\nrelationship between business and politics included: \u201cpolitical work is the\nlifeline of all economic work\u201d (\u653f\u6cbb\u5de5\u4f5c\u662f\u4e00\u5207\u7ecf\u6d4e\u5de5\u4f5c\u7684\u751f\u547d\u7ebf) and \u201cred and professional\u201d (\u53c8\u7ea2\u53c8\u4e13), the latter found in the passage above. In\nthis oppositional relationship between \u201cspeaking politics\u201d and \u201cspeaking\nbusiness\u201d (\u8bb2\u4e1a\u52a1) there is an\nundercurrent of power struggle, and this power struggle was present in the\narts, in the military and in the economy. <\/p>\n\n\n After the Lushan Conference was held in 1959, Lin\nBiao, who catered to Mao and emphasized the spiritual role of people, succeeded\nPeng Dehuai as Minister of Defense and was appointed vice chairman of the Central\nMilitary Commission (CMC). The next year, the official commentary on\nNational Day in the People\u2019s Liberation Army Daily<\/em>, the mouthpiece of\nthe CMC, said: \u201cThe power of the material atomic bomb is great, but the power\nof the spiritual atomic bomb is greater still. This spiritual atomic bomb is\nthe political consciousness and courage of the people.\u201d <\/p>\n\n\n The\nterm \u201cspiritual atomic bomb\u201d took the notion of \u201cpolitics\u201d and elevated it to\nthe plane of strategic weaponry. <\/p>\n\n\n On January 12, 1965, a news story about \u201cspeaking politics\u201d in the economic realm was published in the People\u2019s Daily<\/em>, and this was also the first time that \u201cspeaking politics\u201d emerged in a headline in the newspaper. The headline, somewhat shortened here, was: \u201cSpeaking Politics Must Come First in Buying and Selling<\/a>.\u201d <\/p>\n\n\n From\nthe 1960s to the 1970s, the meaning of \u201cspeaking politics\u201d can be equated with\nMao Zedong Thought. During this period, which of course includes the Cultural Revolution,\nphrases like \u201cgiving prominence to politics\u201d (\u7a81\u51fa\u653f\u6cbb) and \u201cpolitics first\u201d (\u653f\u6cbb\u7b2c\u4e00) rise dramatically. After the end of the Cultural Revolution, these phrases came under sharp criticism, associated\nwith Lin Biao and with the Gang of Four.<\/p>\n\n\n Deng Xiaoping\u2019s priority was on business and the\neconomy, and he famously said: \u201cIt does not matter whether a cat is black or\nwhite, but a cat that can catch mice is a good cat.\u201d As Deng\u2019s reform and opening\npolicy defined a new direction for the country, Deng abandoned the Mao era slogan\nabout \u201cgiving prominence to politics,\u201d but he did not outright deny the\nimportant role of politics. In August 1986, Deng said during\nan inspection tour<\/a> of the city of Tianjin: \u201cIf, alongside reform and modern\nscience and technology, we speak politics, this will have the most power. At\nany time, we must speak politics.\u201d <\/p>\n\n\n In the\nJiang Era, \u201cSpeaking Politics\u201d Becomes a Slogan<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n Consolidating power is a hard necessity for each leadership group. And after the criticizing of Lin Biao and the Gang of Four, it was no longer possible for Jiang to use Mao era slogans without incurring public resentment. In this context, the more direct phrase \u201cspeaking politics,\u201d not over-burdened with Maoist associations, was chosen as a political slogan. The following graph show the slogans \u201cspeaking politics\u201d (blue), \u201cpolitics in command\u201d (orange) and \u201cgiving prominence to politics\u201d (yellow) in various eras. <\/p>\n\n\n On November 8, 1995, Jiang Zemin said<\/a> during an inspection tour in Beijing: \u201cWhen we conduct education for cadres, we must emphasize speaking study, speaking politics and speaking rightness. The entire country should act in this way, and the city of Beijing should serve a guiding role.\u201d This speech initiated what at the time was referred to as the \u201cthree speaks education\u201d (\u4e09\u8bb2\u6559\u80b2). On November 25, two weeks later, \u201cspeaking politics\u201d appeared in a headline in the People\u2019s Daily<\/em>: <\/p>\n\n\n This article in the People\u2019s Daily<\/em>\noffered an essential definition of the \u201cthree speaks, as follows: <\/p>\n\n\n Speaking politics includes\npolitical orientation (<\/em>\u653f\u6cbb\u65b9\u5411<\/em>), political viewpoint (<\/em>\u653f\u6cbb\u89c2\u70b9<\/em>), political discipline (<\/em>\u653f\u6cbb\u7eaa\u5f8b<\/em>), political discernment (<\/em>\u653f\u6cbb\u9274\u522b\u529b<\/em>), political acumen (<\/em>\u653f\u6cbb\u654f\u9510\u6027<\/em>) . . . . Leaders and cadres at all levels\nmust remain sober and determined in their politics, maintaining unity in\npolitical and ideological terms with the Party of which Comrade Jiang Zemin is\nthe core. <\/em><\/p>\n\n\n By this time, Deng\nXiaoping was already old and frail, and in just over a year the old architect\nof the reform and opening policy would pass away. In order to consolidate his\npolitical power, Jiang Zemin defined and emphasized the notion of \u201cspeaking politics\u201d\nas concession to his core leadership status, and obedience to his leadership. <\/p>\n\n\n Jiang Zemin\nemphasized again and again that news work (\u65b0\u95fb\u5de5\u4f5c), or journalism, must speak politics. In September\n1996, Jiang made a visit to the People\u2019s Daily, during which he said there was\na need to \u201cput the authority of leadership of news and public opinion in firmly\nin the hands of people who respect Marxism, respect the Party, and respect the\npeople; news and public opinion units definitely must put adherence to the\ncorrect political orientation and adherence to correct guidance of public opinion\nin the primary position in all of their work.\u201d <\/p>\n\n\n In the Xi Era, \u201cSpeaking Politics\u201d is Renovated<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n In Xi Jinping\u2019s so-called \u201cNew Era,\u201d \u201cspeaking politics\u201d has become more important than ever. In the seven years from 2013 to 2019, here is how the term \u201cspeaking politics\u201d trended in the People\u2019s Daily<\/em>:<\/p>\n\n\n In\nJanuary 2016, Xi Jinping said\nduring the 6th<\/sup> full session of the 18th<\/sup> Central Discipline\nInspection Commission<\/a>: \u201cWe adhere to the [principle that] the Party must\nmanage the Party, that the Party must be strictly governed. The investigation\nof the serious disciplinary and legal violations of Zhou Yongkang, Bo Xilai, Xu\nCaihou, Guo Boxiong, Ling Jihua, Su Rong and others have emphasized strict\npolitical discipline and the rules, creating an atmosphere of clear-cut\npolitics and strict discipline.\u201d From this point on, the phrase \u201cspeaking politics\nwith a clear banner\u201d would make frequent appearances in the Party-run media. <\/p>\n\n\n In October the same year, during the 6th Plenum of the 18th<\/sup> Central Committee of the CCP, Xi Jinping\u2019s status as \u201ccore\u201d leader was established, and on February 14 of the following year, \u201cspeaking politics\u201d appeared in a related headline in the People\u2019s Daily<\/em>: \u201c[We] Must Speak Politics With a Clear Banner<\/a>.\u201d <\/p>\n\n\n The phrase \u201cspeaking politics appeared no less than 13 times in the commentary. \u201cSpeaking politics is a fundamental requirement of a Marxist political party, our calcium supplement,\u201d the commentary said at one point, attributing the idea to Xi Jinping. \u201cSpeaking politics concerns the future and fate of the Party,\u201d is said at another point. And: \u201cSpeaking politics is not the repetition of old tunes, nor is it the far-left politics in the \u2018Cultural Revolution\u2019; rather, it is directed and practical.\u201d <\/p>\n\n\n In terms of consolidation of power, the \u201cNew\nEra\u201d has been a robust period of new slogan manufacturing, all lending fresh\nlayers of discourse to the notion of \u201cspeaking politics.\u201d Prominent among these\nslogans have been the so-called \u201cFour Consciousnesses\u201d\u2014\u201cpolitical consciousness\u201d\n(\u653f\u6cbb\u610f\u8bc6), \u201cconsciousness of the overall situation\u201d (\u5927\u5c40\u610f\u8bc6), \u201cconsciousness\nof the core\u201d (\u6838\u5fc3\u610f\u8bc6) and \u201ccompliance consciousness\u201d (\u770b\u9f50\u610f\u8bc6)\u2014and\nthe \u201ctwo protections\u201d (protection of the core leadership status of Xi Jinping,\nand of the centralized leadership of the Chinese Communist Party). <\/p>\n\n\n In his comprehensive review of Chinese political\ndiscourse in 2019<\/a>, Qian Gang looked at how local Party media and military\nmedia (\u519b\u62a5) used the \u201cfour consciousnesses\n\u201c and the \u201ctwo protections,\u201d signaling their loyalty to Xi Jinping and the\nParty. For example, on November 22, 2019, the local Wulong News<\/em> in\nChongqing used the phrase \u201crespecting the core, protecting the core, complying\nwith the core, and following the core\u201d (\u5fe0\u8bda\u6838\u5fc3\u3001\u7ef4\u62a4\u6838\u5fc3\u3001\u770b\u9f50\u6838\u5fc3\u3001\u8ffd\u968f\u6838\u5fc3). Jiangxi province\u2019s official Gan\u2019nan\nDaily<\/em> wrote on the same day of \u201cprotecting the core, supporting the core,\nand following the core both in our hearts and in our outward actions\u201d (\u5c06\u7ef4\u62a4\u6838\u5fc3\u3001\u62e5\u6234\u6838\u5fc3\u3001\u8ffd\u968f\u6838\u5fc3\u5185\u5316\u4e8e\u5fc3\u3001\u5916\u5316\u4e8e\u884c). <\/p>\n\n\n At the 4th<\/sup> Plenum in October 2019,\nPolitburo Member Ding Xuexiang wrote in\nthe People\u2019s Daily<\/em><\/a>: <\/p>\n\n\n The \u2018Two Protections\u2019 have\na clear meaning and demand, to protect the core status of General Secretary Xi\nJinping, and the object is General Secretary Xi Jinping and no other person; to\nprotect the centralized and unified authority of the Central Committee of the\nCCP, the object being the Party\u2019s Central Committee and no other organization. The\nauthority of the CCP Central Committee determines the authority of Party\norganizations at all levels, and the authority of Party organizations at all\nlevels comes from the authority of the CCP Central Committee. The \u2018Two Protections\u2019\ncan neither be applied layer by layer nor extended at will. <\/em><\/p>\n\n\n This passage makes it very explicit what is\nmeant by \u201cspeaking politics.\u201d As Ding Xuexiang lays out the essentials, there\ncan be no doubt whatsoever. <\/p>\n\n\n As the Epidemic Raged, What Did \u201cSpeaking Politics\u201d\nMean? <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n 2020\nwas meant to be China\u2019s year of victory in its war against poverty and the\nbuilding of a \u201cmoderately well-off society.\u201d Early on in the year, before the\ncoronavirus epidemic was pushed into the spotlight, it was clear that this\nsupposed victory was the\ncenterpiece of the Party\u2019s propaganda strategy<\/a>. <\/p>\n\n\n In Wuhan, which would soon become the epicenter of the epidemic, the Changjiang Daily<\/em>, the official newspaper of the municipal Party committee, was not to be outdone in its declaration of victory in the war on poverty. A front-page article in the paper declared that Wuhan would become “China’s Fifth City” after Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen. <\/p>\n\n\n In\nearly 2020, as the coronavirus outbreak spread, what took precedence in the\npolitics of Wuhan and Hubei province? The priorities were the celebration of\nthe annual Spring Festival, the holding of the city and provincial sessions of\nthe people\u2019s congress and political consultative conference, the touting of the\nParty\u2019s victories in fighting poverty, and the \u201cTwo Protections.\u201d All of these\nwere ultimately about the \u201cFour Consciousnesses,\u201d and as such were about the\ncore status of Xi Jinping and the leadership of the Central Committee. <\/p>\n\n\n On\nJanuary 10, the Changjiang Daily<\/em>, Wuhan\u2019s official Party newspaper,\npublished the speech given\nby the city\u2019s top leader, Ma Guoqiang<\/a> (\u9a6c\u56fd\u5f3a) to the local people\u2019s congress. In his\nspeech, Ma emphasized the need to \u201cspeak politics with a clear banner.\u201d Nowhere\nin his speech did Ma mention the coronavirus outbreak, which at that point was still\nnot being dealt with openly in China. <\/p>\n\n\n On February\n15, not long after Ma\nGuoqiang\u2019s replacement<\/a> as Wuhan\u2019s top leader, the Changjiang Daily<\/em>\nran a report about a study session<\/a>\nled by the city\u2019s new top leader, Wang Zhonglin, that again emphasized \u201cspeaking\npolitics,\u201d though by his point the response to the coronavirus epidemic was an open\nagenda, having redirected the focus of news and propaganda efforts since Xi\nJinping\u2019s first public comment<\/a> on the epidemic on January 20. The Changjiang\nDaily<\/em> piece read: \u201cUnder the provincial Party leadership of session leader Comrade\nYing Yong, and under the guidance of session leader Comrade Wang Zhonglin of\nthe city\u2019s Party Committee, [the study session] spoke politics, attended to the\ngeneral situation and abided by the rules.\u201d <\/p>\n\n\n \u201cSpeaking\npolitics\u201d has had varying meanings at different times in China\u2019s history. In\nthe early days of 2020, as the virus silently spread, \u201cspeaking politics\u201d meant\n\u201cnot talking haphazardly\u201d (\u4e0d\u51c6\u5230\u5904\u4e71\u8bb2). Once the response effort had actually begun\nafter January 20, \u201cspeaking politics\u201d meant shutting down cities, closing off\nroads and building emergency\nfield hospitals like Huoshenshan<\/a>. At the most challenging point of the\nresponse effort, \u201cspeaking politics\u201d meant carrying out stability preservation\nin restive residential districts \u2013 like the one in Wuhan that heckled\nVice-Premier Sun Chunlan<\/a> during her inspection tour on March 6. In the most\nrecent stage of China\u2019s response, \u201cspeaking politics\u201d is about being tough on\nrestricting international arrivals who might reintroduce the virus, and about\ngetting economic activity going again. <\/p>\n\n\n \u201cSpeaking politics\u201d has often meant rushing into disaster \u2013 and many, like Doctor Li Wenliang (\u674e\u6587\u4eae) and Doctor Jiang Xueqing (\u6c5f\u5b66\u5e86), have paid with their lives for its expedient focus on the shifting interests of the CCP leadership. So long as China fails to face the painful lessons of \u201cspeaking politics\u201d and its privilege over humanity and conscience, its flag will continue to fly high, drawing attention away from real threats and dangers. <\/p>\n\n\n <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Infectious diseases have no politics. In January 2020, through the course of the Wuhan people\u2019s congress and the provincial people\u2019s congress, no new coronavirus cases were reported in China. But the epidemic continued unabated \u2013 paying no heed to the political prerogatives of the Chinese Communist Party. One of the medical facilities hardest hit by […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":5,"featured_media":45672,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[6],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-45670","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-china-newspeak"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/chinamediaproject.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/03\/Tao-Lesi-2.png\")
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