Who is the fairest of them all?
You, Dear Leader, are the fairest.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n
The People\u2019s Daily<\/em> is the best (if not the fairest) reflection we have of the Chinese Communist Party\u2019s own self-image. We gaze into its pages to better understand how the Party, at any point in time, regards itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n The February 20, 2016, edition of the People\u2019s Daily<\/em>\u200a\u2014\u200aessentially a bold red birth announcement for Xi Jinping\u2019s fully-developed media policy\u200a\u2014\u200atells us even more: What kind of reflection China\u2019s leaders hope to see of themselves in the great mirror of domestic and international public opinion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Xi Jinping\u2019s media policy, which we might call \u201cControl 3.0,\u201d is a map for all-dimensional control (\u5168\u65b9\u4f4d\u63a7\u5236)\u200a\u2014\u200athat\u2019s our term, not the Party\u2019s\u200a\u2014\u200ainvolving Party domination of the message as reflected in both domestic and international public opinion, across all imaginable media platforms (including advertising and entertainment).<\/p>\n\n\n\n News Friday that President Xi was paying visits to Xinhua News Agency, the People\u2019s Daily <\/em>and China Central Television was the first sign that announcement of a new or refined media policy was imminent. It was during a visit to People\u2019s Daily in June 2008, more than five years into his administration, that Xi Jinping\u2019s predecessor, Hu Jintao, articulated his full-fledged media policy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The front-page piece in the February 20 edition of the People\u2019s Daily<\/em> is an in-depth treatment of Xi Jinping\u2019s \u201cimportant speech\u201d on the role of media. Further details may come over the next few weeks. But for now, we can summarise the various media policies of the past three leadership generations in the following way:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Jiang Zemin \/ Control 1.0:<\/strong> \u201cGuidance of public opinion,\u201d or yulun daoxiang<\/em> (\u8206\u8bba\u5bfc\u5411), the notion that media control (the almost exclusive focus being domestic and Chinese-language), is essential to the maintenance of social and political stability. Emphasis of Party leadership of the media under the Mao-era notion of \u201cpoliticians running the newspapers,\u201d or zhengzhijia banbao<\/em> (\u653f\u6cbb\u5bb6\u529e\u62a5), and the idea that public opinion control is for the benefit of the people (\u798f\u7978\u8bba).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Hu Jintao \/ Control 2.0:<\/strong> \u201cChanneling of public opinion,\u201d or yulun yindao<\/em> (\u8206\u8bba\u5f15\u5bfc), the notion (more a refinement of \u201cguidance\u201d) that the Party should more actively direct coverage of breaking news events, and better exploit the resources of commercial media and the Internet to ensure the Party\u2019s own agendas dominate. Increasing concern after 2007 with \u201csoft power\u201d development and transmitting \u201cChina\u2019s [official] voice\u201d overseas.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Xi Jinping \/ Control 3.0:<\/strong> The \u201c48-character policy\u201d (48\u5b57\u65b9\u9488), an all-dimensional vision of comprehensive control across media platforms and bridging the domestic\/international frames, articulated through 12 four-character phrases.<\/p>\n\n\n\n If the Jiang and Hu-era policies were encapsulated in the four-character phrases \u201cpublic opinion guidance\u201d and \u201cpublic opinion channeling\u201d respectively, we might say that Xi Jinping\u2019s policy is encapsulated in the hardline phrase \u201cpublic opinion struggle,\u201d or yulun douzheng<\/em> (\u8206\u8bba\u6597\u4e89), introduced in his August 19, 2013, speech. It may be too early to make that leap. The phrase does not appear in the People\u2019s Daily<\/em> coverage of Xi Jinping\u2019s \u201cimportant speech\u201d on Friday. However, an accompanying official editorial (\u793e\u8bba) in the People\u2019s Daily<\/em> does mention the phrase \u201cideological struggle,\u201d or yishixingtai douzheng<\/em> (\u610f\u8bc6\u5f62\u6001\u6597\u4e89), which is essentially equivalent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The \u201c48-character policy\u201d is an important new feature of Xi Jinping\u2019s media control regime, promoted right at the top of the front page of the People\u2019s Daily<\/em>. Nothing in there sounds very fresh. But Xi Jinping\u2019s language is notably tough in comparison to that of his predecessors. Here is one passage from the People\u2019s Daily<\/em>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Party\u2019s news and public opinion work must adhere to the principle of the Party character, cleaving fundamentally to the Party\u2019s leadership of news and public opinion work. Media run by the Party and government are propaganda positions of the Party and the government, and they must reflect the Party (\u5fc5\u987b\u59d3\u515a) [lit., \u201cbe surnamed Party\u201d]. All work of the Party\u2019s news and public opinion media must reflect (\u4f53\u73b0) the will of the Party, mirror (\u53cd\u6620) the views of the Party, preserve the authority of the Party, preserve the unity of the Party, and achieve love of the Party, protection of the Party and acting for the Party (\u7231\u515a\u3001\u62a4\u515a\u3001\u4e3a\u515a); they must all increase their consciousness of falling in line, maintaining a high level of uniformity (\u9ad8\u5ea6\u4e00\u81f4) with the Party in ideology, politics and action.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n The talk of \u201cmaintaining a high level of uniformity\u201d is unique in this context, and the passage about \u201clove of the Party, protection of the Party and acting for the Party\u201d is a Xi Jinping neologism we might expect to see entering dominant discourse. Both speak to a heightened sense of urgency about the need for media in all of its aspects to fall in line with the leadership.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Along with the \u201c48-character policy,\u201d the following passage from the People\u2019s Daily can be regarded\u200a\u2014\u200afor all its verbosity\u200a\u2014\u200aas a refined statement of the Xi Jinping media control agenda:<\/p>\n\n\n\n He emphasised that the Party\u2019s news and public opinion work is an important task for the Party, that it is a major matter concerning the management of national affairs and [the maintenance of] national peace and stability; [The Party and the media] must grasp their position [and role] with the overall work of the Party as the point of departure, and accommodating situational developments domestically and internationally; [They must] adhere to the leadership of the Party, adhere to correct political orientation, adhere to a work guidance of people at the core, respect the principles of news and communication, innovate their methods, and effectively improve the propagation force (\u4f20\u64ad\u529b), guiding capacity (\u5f15\u5bfc\u529b), influence (\u5f71\u54cd\u529b) and credibility (\u516c\u4fe1\u529b) of the Party\u2019s news and public opinion.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n The all-dimensional nature of these controls becomes clearer further down in the People\u2019s Daily treatment of Xi Jinping\u2019s speech. The language is a noticeable departure from Hu Jintao\u2019s focus on \u201cchanneling,\u201d which prioritised agenda control in the event of major breaking news stories:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Xi Jinping pointed out that correct guidance of public opinion must be adhered to in all of the various aspects of news and public opinion work. Party newspapers and journals, and radio and television stations at all levels must abide by [correct] guidance; commercial tabloid newspapers and magazines (\u90fd\u5e02\u7c7b\u62a5\u520a) and new media must abide by [correct] guidance; news reports must abide by [correct] guidance; publication supplements, special programs, advertising and publicity must abide by [correct] guidance; current affairs news must abide by [correct] guidance; entertainment and social news must also abide by [correct] guidance; domestic news reports must abide by [correct] guidance, and international news reports must also abide by [correct] guidance.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n If Hu Jintao\u2019s Control 2.0 approach was strategic and selective, Xi Jinping\u2019s Control 3.0 approach is no-holds-barred. To the extent that President Xi addresses the need to \u201cinnovate\u201d\u200a\u2014\u200afor example, to \u201cpromote integrated development\u201d\u200a\u2014\u200ahe is talking about the need for tightly controlled media to find new ways of aligning the Party\u2019s demands and public demand. This strategic objective extends internationally, with a vision of \u201cflagship external propaganda media.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n [We] must strengthen the building of our international communication capacity, increasing our international discourse power and focussing the proper telling of China\u2019s story, at the same time optimising our strategic layout, working to build flagship external propaganda media that have rather strong reputations internationally.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n Any sense we might have glimpsed in the Jiang and Hu eras of the need for \u201cmedia reform\u201d\u200a\u2014\u200ain the loosest sense of improving the way media report and operate commercially and professionally\u200a\u2014\u200ais now completely gone. Even innovation must revolve around the central priority of advancing the Party\u2019s agenda.<\/p>\n\n\n\n And what about \u201csupervision by public opinion,\u201d or yulun jiandu<\/em> (\u8206\u8bba\u76d1\u7763), that mantle of officially recognised press scrutiny (sometimes translated \u201cwatchdog journalism\u201d) that Party officials since Premier Zhao Ziyang have regarded as a necessary form of power monitoring?<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cSupervision by public opinion\u201d is the closest one can come in the Party\u2019s mainstream press discourse to the idea that an honest, self-critical gaze has value. But Xi Jinping now distorts \u201csupervision\u201d with what has long been its polar opposite. \u201cSupervision by public opinion and positive propaganda are unified,\u201d says the summary in the People\u2019s Daily<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Given the robustness of Xi Jinping\u2019s efforts to remake public opinion in the Party\u2019s image, the question of self-reflection and self-recognition takes on new urgency.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Will China, now on the brink of the 50th anniversary of the start of the Cultural Revolution, have the capacity to see itself clearly? Will it remember what the country became when a single vain revolutionary was able to gaze into the pages of the People\u2019s Daily<\/em>, the Liberation Army Daily<\/em> and Red Flag<\/em>\u200a\u2014\u200athe notorious \u201ctwo papers and one journal\u201d\u200a\u2014\u200aand see a hallucination of himself gazing back?<\/p>\n\n\n\n Mirror, mirror on the wall Visiting the official People’s Daily, Xi Jinping outlined a new media control policy emphasising CCP control over all aspects of media. <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":5,"featured_media":39662,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-39646","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-headlines-and-hashtags"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n![\"48](\"https:\/\/chinamediaproject.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2016\/02\/48-characters-policy-500x237.png\")
<\/div><\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n\n
I\u2019ll come back to these 12 phrases next week, but notice that the first four phrases along the top line all deal with the centrality of the Party and the need for media to serve its larger political agenda. They are: \u201craising high the banner\u201d (\u9ad8\u4e3e\u65d7\u5e1c), a reference to the primacy of socialism with Chinese characteristics; \u201cpublic opinion leadership\u201d (\u5f15\u9886\u5bfc\u5411), essentially an invocation of Jiang-era \u201cguidance\u201d and the need for agenda control; \u201crevolving around the centre\u201d (\u56f4\u7ed5\u4e2d\u5fc3), meaning full obedience to the leadership of the Party\u2019s Central Committee; and \u201cserving the overall situation\u201d (\u670d\u52a1\u5927\u5c40), meaning that expedient political considerations take precedence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Who is the fairest of them all?
You, President Xi, are the fairest.
<\/em>
<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"